and the nation's ability to control that flow, have substantially altered the context in which admissions decisions must be made. The first of these events was the passage of a new Refugee Act in March; the second was the beginning of a mass asylum crisis in April, when the Cuban "freedom flotilla" began.
Together, they have created practical and political difficulties that cannot be resolved unless the nation turns more of its attention to the refugee problem in this hemisphere, responds to that problem in a manner that places predominant emphasis on human rights rather than on ideology, and enlists more multilateral and bilateral cooperation in an attempt both to minimize the number of refugees and more equitably resettle those who cannot be repatriated.
THE EFFECT OF THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980
The new Refugee Act incorporates into domestic law for the first time a definition that is not ideologically or geographically limited. Under the new law, any person from any part of the world is eligible for refugee status, provided that he or she can demonstrate a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin- When Congress passed the new Refugee Act, it apparently believed that no more than 5,000 aliens per year would enter the United States with potentially valid asylum claims. Given the fact that nearly 20,000 such claims were pending in November, 1979 , and that at least as many potential claims were being administratively bypassed at the time the Refugee Act was enacted, such an estimate may have been overly optimistic. Aggressive punitive measures directed at asylum-seekers may retard their influx, but will not stem it so long as the underlying reasons for that flow remain intact.
The United States, with the highest standard of living in the Western Hemisphere and a tradition of political freedom, will draw many aliens to its 8 As of 15 November 1981, bills had been introduced or proposed in the Senate that would strip asylum-seekers of many of their due-process rights and make them subject to interdiction at sea in violation of customary rules of international law; change the current refugee definition; and put an overall "cap" on immigration that would effectively limit refugee flow. The short-term effects will derive, in large part, from the Cuban government's response to the United States's more belligerent attitude toward it and from efforts of the INS to repatriate Haitians and exclude Salvadorans. In all probability, the flow of refugees from nations in the Western Hemisphere into the United States will be reduced quite substantially. At least three-quarters of all potential asylum-seekers entering the United States in 1980 were Cubans, many of whom had political reasons for leaving. Yet the large-scale sea migration could not have occurred without the Castro regime's active intervention, and clearly was manipulated for that regime's own political ends. As a result, the regime was able both to profiteer and to export some undesirable Cubans who had spent time in criminal or mental institutions and who did not meet any of the criteria of the current definition of refugee.
The Reagan administration has reportedly admonished Castro not to unleash another exodus of boat people to Florida and has demanded a commitment from Havana to take back hundreds of the undesirable Cubans who emigrated to the United States during 1980. " In its attempt to curb Cuban activities in the hemisphere, including the provision of military aid to the insurgents in El Salvador, the United States has threatened Cuba with a variety of reprisals, including possible military action or a naval quarantine. To date, this tough stance seems to have prevented any repetition of last year's orchestrated exodus.
In marked contrast to its activities surrounding the 1980 occupation of the Peruvian embassy when the Cuban government granted almost unlimited access to embassy grounds and took no active steps to expel Cuban nationals, the Cuban government acted swiftly in February 1981 to evict aliens attempting to obtain asylum on the Ecuadoran embassy grounds. Nor was there any repetition in 1981 of the wide-spread granting of exit visas that characterized the 1980 episode.
The current treatment of Salvadorans and Haitians may discourage some of their friends or relatives from seeking to enter the United States. For potential refugees from El Salvador, the prospects appear to be for a greater, rather than a lesser, flow from that country, since Salvadoran refugees need only cross inadequately patrolled land borders to enter the United States. The number of persons displaced by fighting in El Salvador or targeted for extermination by right-and left-wing death squads has grown rapidly in the last year. U.S. pressure against Cuba and Nicaragua may decrease the flow of arms to left-wing insurgents; yet additional U.S. military aid specifically designed to help the present government to extend its control over the rugged countryside is certain to produce more refugees.
The volume of Haitian refugees seeking asylum in the United States is also likely to rise steadily. Since the summer of 1980, the situation in Haiti has worsened: Hurricane Allen further impoverished the poorest country in the hemisphere; the government's crackdown on the press and imprisonment of human-rights activists in late 1980 demonstrated again how deep the disregard for human rights is in Haiti; and the government's unwillingness to repatriate any of its nationals illegally in the Bahamas left some thirty thousand unwanted Haitians with no place to go. By establishing its detention program and enlisting the diplomatic support of the Haitian government in the interdiction of vessels containing Haitians, the Reagan administration has sought to counterbalance these increased migration pressures. The impact of these measures will not be determined until the spring and summer of 1982, when the weather will be most favorable for the traffic of small boats. Yet it is already clear that successful legal attacks on portions of the detention program have undercut the administration's ability to regulate the flow. The Coast Guard's presence off the coast of Haiti is minimal and is not likely to increase. Equally important, the government of Haiti has nothing to gain from cooperating enthusiastically in the repatriation of its dissidents and its poor, and the United States, given its unwillingness to undercut its allies in the ideological struggle against the "totalitarian" left, lacks a credible "tough" response to force such cooperation.
Even if the United States currently possessed the means to exclude Haitian or
Salvadoran refugees as effectively as it may be able to exclude Cubans, it is doubtful in the long run whether such exclusion either could be maintained or would prove beneficial. Barriers to entry will be only partially effective, particularly along the porous Mexican border, and the cost of a gunboat diplomacy to keep that flow away from U.S. shores may be prohibitive, not only in dollars and cents, but also in terms of maintaining good relationships with other "receiver" or "conduit" nations and of upholding the country's international reputation generally.'2 Under these circumstances, pressures to limit the entry of refugees will always be competing with, and sometimes be outweighed by, international pressures. Such pressure will frequently be intensified by strongly voiced domestic sentiment for the admission of particular groups of refugees who appeal to the humanitarian or ethnic sensibilities of certain segments of the U.S. population.
For these reasons, unless the U.S. government addresses refugee-producing situations directly, it will grow increasingly difficult to exclude asylum-seekers, not only those coming from El Salvador and Haiti, but also from other countries in the region. It is probable that among these asylum-seekers will be a substantial number of Cubans. Current governmental responses to the Castro regime may have stemmed the tide, but cannot be expected to hold it back indefinitely. It is hardly accidental that the United States resettled over 900,000
Cubans in the first twenty years of Castro's rule. Geographical proximity, a 12 According to the Government Accounting Office (GAO), it would require "an increase of $125 million in the [INS] $250 million annual operating costs" to obtain the personnel, fencing, helicopters, and so forth, necessary "to secure about 10 percent of the 2,000-mile Mexican border" Similarly, it must be the goal of the United States government to maintain full and adequate diplomatic relationships with every nation in Central America and the Caribbean, whatever their political tendencies, since each has the potential either to send refugees seeking asylum to the United States or to act as a conduit during periods of economic or political upheaval.
Bilateral and Multilateral Development Assistance
A point that is too seldom emphasized is the indirect nature of the relationship between the level and type of development assistance and the expansion or contraction of refugee flow. For example, money given or lent to Haiti to build roads or irrigate farms is not the equivalent of money used to purchase food or shelter or medical supplies for those fleeing from persecution in Ethiopia or Cambodia. In the latter instance, the expected benefit, although frequently substantial, is short term: to give temporary aid to starving, homeless, diseased people; if these people are placed in refugee camps, those camps are not selfsustaining, and the aid must be constantly renewed. In contrast, the expected benefit of development assistance is characteristically long term, and positive results may not begin to emerge until long after the money is spent: for example, the road in Haiti may remain unused until a cement plant is built at its terminal point.
Associated with the short-term nature of refugee relief are fairly immediate indicators of success, which are closely tied to the results of persecution or want.
Thus, relief aid can be deemed successful if people no longer starve, have a roof over their heads, and no longer contract various diseases in large numbers.
Measuring the success of development assistance is always difficult. It becomes even more so when such assistance is linked to policy expectations in the humanrights and refugee areas.
The lack of a direct, general relationship between development assistance and Development assistance directed toward the poor of the region can therefore serve a significant, although indirect, role in eventually reducing refugee flow.
Yet because the effect of such aid is indirect, and thus may take a number of years to unfold fully, such programs as are developed with the objective of reducing the flow of refugees should be given ample opportunity to work before being curtailed or terminated. Because it is clear that the United States lacks the resources to finance sweeping social changes throughout the Caribbean and Central America, it should choose its target countries carefully, focusing most of its attention on nations that are either already refugee senders or likely to become so. U.S. policymakers should also make a special effort to promote social reform at the grass-roots level in Haiti and Jamaica, both of which are likely to be significant refugee senders in the 1980s.
For many of the same considerations that warrant the "targeting" of bilateral development assistance, the United States should also become more heavily involved in multilateral development programs than it has in the recent past. The Reagan administration's approach to date is highly equivocal. On one hand, it has offered increased economic assistance to the government of El Salvador and joined in the multilateral North-South dialogue initiated at the Cancun con- 
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It is through lending agencies such as the World Bank and through regional development institutions that the appropriate type and level of aid can best be initiated, and the cost and risks associated with such aid best distributed.
Although these institutions are hardly apolitical, they can be expected to put greater emphasis on long-term development goals than on short-term trade advantages to the lender. Linking these development goals to current concerns about human rights in desperately poor countries such as Haiti, however, is likely to prove as difficult for international assistance authorities as it is for the United States Congress. Clearly, recipient nations must not only meet requirements for financial accountability, they must also give reasonable assurances that this assistance will not be used to strengthen their repressive
capabilities. Yet properly designed and monitored aid programs can both contribute very materially to the economic and social well-being of a population and substantially strengthen ground-level participatory institutions despite efforts of a repressive regime to misuse them.
Bilateral Military Assistance
Perhaps the most obvious source of bilateral leverage is with regard to U.S. military assistance. In general, the United States should seek to dissociate itself from repression by denying exports of arms, munitions, and military or police equipment to the military or police forces in countries where human rights are known to be violated or where the record is questionable. Such sanctions are already required by U.S. law; yet such legislation has been applied inconsistently, particularly in cases where other U.S. interests such as the regional balance of power, U.S. base rights, and continued constructive bilateral relations are perceived to be at stake.
Many of the countries in this hemisphere have a long tradition of military rule, sometimes only intermittently replaced by more democratic forms of government. Individuals such as Pinochet, Batista, Trujillo, and the Somozas have all demonstrated how the military can be turned into an instrument of systematic persecution. Thus, military power in all of Latin America, although sometimes relatively benign, has the potential to be used, not to counter external threats, but to repress internal dissent. The recent spread of terrorism, in some instances clearly supported from abroad, has tended to obscure the boundary between the two. As recent events in Argentina, El Salvador, and Guatemala illustrate, the military reaction to such terrorism, however much it may be motivated by fears of Marxist revolution, can seriously and systematically undermine political and other human rights and help create large numbers of potential refugees.
Military dictatorships will continue to seize power in Latin America and they will continue to exercise that power according to their own political views whether or not the United States provides military assistance. Yet the scope of that power, and the regimes' ability to use it directly against domestic dissidents, will often depend on the amount and nature of U.S. military assistance being There are obvious parallels between recent events in this hemisphere and those that prompted the Geneva meeting: the large-scale movements of refugees by land and sea into neighboring territories; the consequent use of force to intercept emigrant vessels; the detention of asylum-seekers in harsh holding camps; and the summary repatriation of the refugees to their homelands with only a minimum of due process. Clearly, the time has come to reassert the principles of asylum and non-refoulement. In addition, the recent expulsion of large Steps should be taken now, however, before the next refugee crisis begins, to determine the depth of commitment that particular countries in the region have to their neighbors. To the fullest degree possible such commitments should be intensified by bringing other countries into the planning and implementation of development assistance programs targeted on probable sender nations and by developing aid programs specifically keyed to the problems of other receiver nations. Steps should also be taken now to establish a program for screening refugee applicants either in their country of origin or in some other locality not likely to be chosen as a country of final asylum. In this way, it will be possible to distribute refugees among various countries according to some mutually agreeable plan without necessitating overly extensive involvement by chosen countries of final asylum.
Even if a means of processing refugees in their country of origin, or at some third-country holding center, is developed, it is unlikely that the individual countries receiving applications will choose to surrender their power to determine the bona fides of particular claims to a collective body. This is not to say that actual processing may not be affected by decisions reached through multilateral negotiations or that UNHCR determinations may not be afforded great weight. Actual screening by the United States may well prove to be a formality in many cases. Yet the same political considerations that favor recommending that new U.S. asylum procedures give the UNHCR only an observor's role-namely, that domestic sentiment appears strongly to favor the maintenance of direct governmental control of refugee admissions -apply with even greater force to out-of-country applicants.
Control of applicants for mass asylum will continue to pose difficult political and moral choices for the United States. These difficult choices are not going to disappear soon, but they can be alleviated somewhat if the nation pursues a vigorous foreign policy designed to minimize persecution abroad, particularly in the Western Hemisphere. The primary focus must be on the reduction of refugee flow by eliminating "well-founded fear," rather than on an orchestrated international blindness to those facing imprisonment, torture, or death simply because they belong to the wrong profession or because they happen to express contrary political views.
